We determine the optimal strategies for purchasing term life insurance and for investing in a risky financial market in order to maximize the probability of reaching a bequest goal. We extend our previous work (Bayraktar et al. (2014a, Section 3.1)) in two important ways: (1) we assume that the individual consumes from her investment account, and (2) we add a risky asset to the financial market. We learn that if the rate of consumption is large enough, then the individual will purchase term life insurance at any level of wealth, a surprising result. We also determine when the individual optimally invests more in the risky asset than her current wealth, so-called leveraging.
Introduction
We determine the optimal strategies for purchasing term life insurance and for investing in a risky financial market in order to maximize the probability of reaching a bequest goal. We extend our previous work (Bayraktar et al. (2014a, Section 3.1) ) in two important ways: (1) we assume that the individual consumes from her investment account, and (2) we add a risky asset to the financial market. We learn that if the rate of consumption is large enough, then the individual will purchase term life insurance at any level of wealth, a surprising result. For smaller rates of consumption, we learn that wealthy individuals are more likely to buy insurance than less wealthy individuals.
The work in this paper combines two areas of research. One area is optimal purchasing of life insurance, usually to maximize expected utility; see Bayraktar and Young (2013) and the references therein. For example, Pliska and Ye (2007) have no risky asset in their financial market, and the optimal strategy for purchasing insurance decreases with increasing wealth. By contrast, Richard (1975) includes a risky asset in his financial market, and the optimal strategy for purchasing insurance increases with wealth. In both papers, the researchers maximize expected utility of consumption plus expected utility of wealth at the time of death.
The other area is that of optimally controlling wealth to reach a goal. Research on this topic began with the seminal work of Dubins and Savage (1965, 1976) and continued with the work of Pestien and Sudderth (1985) , Sudderth and Weerasinghe (1989) , Kulldorff (1993) , Karatzas (1997) , and Browne (1997 Browne ( , 1999a Browne ( , and 1999b . Bayraktar et al. (2014a, b) first studied the problem of allowing the individual to buy life insurance in order to reach a bequest goal. In that work, the individual did not consume from the investment account, nor was there a risky asset in which the individual could invest. The only uncertainty was the time of death.
By contrast, in this paper, we assume that the individual consumes from her investment account and that there is a risky asset in which she can invest. The resulting optimal strategy for purchasing life insurance is very different from the one found in Bayraktar et al. (2014a) . Specifically, when there is no risky asset, if the mortality rate is greater than the riskless return, the optimal strategy is not to buy life insurance until wealth reaches the safe level otherwise, if the mortality rate is less than the riskless return, the optimal strategy is to buy life insurance if wealth is less than some level. When there is a risky asset and when the rate of consumption is large enough, it is optimal for the individual to buy insurance at all levels of wealth, a result we did not expect; otherwise, for lower rates of consumption, it is optimal to buy insurance only when wealth is greater than some level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the financial and insurance market in which the individual invests, we formalize the problem of maximizing the probability of reaching a bequest goal, and we give a verification lemma that will help us to find that maximum probability, along with the optimal strategies for investing in the financial market and for purchasing term life insurance. In Section 3, we solve the problem of maximizing the probability of reaching a bequest when the rate of consumption is zero; we separate this case because we can solve it explicitly. Section 4 parallels Section 3 for a positive rate of consumption. In that case, we have an explicit solution only when the rate of consumption is great enough; otherwise, we solve the problem by solving for the Legendre convex dual of the maximum probability. In both Sections 3 and 4, we determine when the optimal investment strategy exhibits leveraging, that is, when the individual borrows from the riskless asset to invest in the risky. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Statement of the problem and verification lemma
In this section, we present the financial and insurance market for the individual. Then, we state the optimization problem that this individual faces and present a verification lemma that we will use to solve the optimization problem.
Financial market and probability of reaching the bequest target
We assume that the individual has an investment account that she manages in order to reach a given bequest target b = 1. She consumes from this account at the constant rate c. The individual invests in a Black-Scholes financial market with one riskless asset earning at the rate r ≥ 0 and one risky asset whose price process S = {S t } t≥0 follows geometric Brownian motion:
in which B = {B t } t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion on a filtered probability space (Ω, F , F = {F t } t≥0 , P), with µ > r and σ > 0. (In interest theory, actuaries call r the force of interest.) Let W t denote the wealth of the individual's investment account at time t ≥ 0. Let π t denote the dollar amount invested in the risky asset at time t ≥ 0. An investment policy Π = {π t } t≥0 is admissible if it is an F-progressively measurable process satisfying t 0 π 2 s ds < ∞ almost surely, for all t ≥ 0. Denote the future lifetime random variables of the individual by τ d . We assume that τ d follows an exponential distribution with mean 1/λ. (In other words, the individual is subject to a constant force of mortality, λ.) We assume that the individual buys life insurance via a premium paid continuously at the rate of h ≥ λ per dollar of insurance. Furthermore, we assume that the individual can change the amount of her insurance coverage at any time. The loading h − λ covers expenses, profit, and risk margin; therefore, we assume that no reserve accumulates. Thus, the set up in this section is equivalent to the individual purchasing instantaneous term life insurance.
Let D t denote the amount of death benefit payable at time τ d that is in force at time t ≥ 0. An insurance strategy D = {D t } t≥0 is admissible if it is F-progressively measurable and non-negative. Thus, with instantaneous term life insurance, wealth follows the dynamics
(2.2)
We assume that the individual seeks to maximize the probability that W τ d ≥ 1, by optimizing over admissible controls (Π, D). We do not insist admissible strategies be such that W t ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0 with probability one because of the constant drain on wealth by the negative drift term −c. Therefore, we end the game if wealth reaches 0 before the individual dies. Define τ 0 = inf{t ≥ 0 : W t ≤ 0}, and define the value function by
in which P w denotes conditional probability given W 0 = w ≥ 0.
Remark 2.1. If wealth is large enough, say at least w s ("s" for safe), then the individual can invest all her wealth in the riskless asset with the interest income sufficient to cover her consumption and insurance premium for death benefit 1 − w s . That is, wealth w s generate interest of rw s = c + h(1 − w s ). By solving this equation for w s , we obtain
which we call the safe level. Thus, φ(w) = 1 if w ≥ w s , and it remains for us to determine φ(w) for 0 ≤ w ≤ w s .
Verification lemma
In this section, we provide a verification lemma that states that a smooth solution to a boundary-value problem (BVP) associated with the maximization problem in (2.3) equals the value function φ. Therefore, we can reduce our problem to one of solving a BVP. We state the verification lemma without proof because its proof is similar to others in the literature; see, for example, Young (2011a, 2011b) .
First, for π ∈ R and D ≥ 0, define a differential operator L π,D by its action on a test function f , whose definition is derived from the wealth dynamics in (2.2).
Lemma 2.1. Let Φ = Φ(w) be a function that is non-decreasing and concave on [0, w s ] with a continuous second derivative. Suppose that Φ satisfies the following BVP:
(2.6)
the optimal amount invested in the risky asset is given in feedback form by
in which W * t is optimally controlled wealth at time t, and the optimal amount of instantaneous term life insurance is given by
(2.8)
Remark 2.2. Because of the linear nature of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation in (2.6) with respect to D, the optimal amount of life insurance to buy at any instant is either 0 or 1 − w.
Remark 2.3. The expected time between now and death that an individual spends with term life insurance D(w) = 1 − w (so that wealth at death equals 1 exactly) is given by 1 λ P w (W τ d ∧τ 0 ≥ 1). Thus, maximizing the expected time with so-called full term life insurance is equivalent to maximizing the probability of reaching the bequest goal.
We use Lemma 2.1 to calculate φ. The solution differs depending on whether c = 0 or c > 0, so we split the problem into those two cases in the next two sections. Specifically, in Section 3, we consider the case for which c = 0 and explicitly determine φ. In Section 4, we consider the case for which c > 0 and obtain an explicit expression for φ when c is large enough. Otherwise, we express φ through its Legendre dual.
The case for which c = 0
In Bayraktar et al. (2014a) , we computed φ in the case for which c = 0, with no risky asset in the market; let φ 0 denote the probability of reaching the bequest goal in this deterministic case. In that work, we found that if r ≥ λ, then the individual does not buy insurance until her wealth reaches the safe level w s = h r+h . Otherwise, if r < λ, then for wealth less than a certain value (w * in that paper), the individual buys term life insurance of 1 − w until she dies or ruins, while for wealth greater than w * , she does not buy insurance until her wealth reaches the safe level. We were able to explicitly compute φ 0 and showed that φ 0 is given by When the financial market includes a risky asset, the corresponding strategy for buying term life insurance is turned on its head. Specifically, for wealth less than the buying level w b ("b" for buy), the individual does not buy life insurance, while for wealth greater than the buying level w b , she buys insurance of 1 − w. Because of the existence of a risky asset, when wealth is low, the individual wants to keep her wealth as free as possible to invest in the risky asset so that she can reach the buy level.
In the following proposition, we present φ and the corresponding optimal strategies for purchasing life insurance and investing in the risky asset. We omit the proof because it is a straightforward application of Lemma 2.1.
Proposition 3.1. If c = 0, the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal is given by
When wealth equals w, the optimal amount of instantaneous term life insurance is given by
5)
and the optimal amount invested in the risky asset is given by
(3.6)
Remark 3.1. As λ increases from 0 to h (for h fixed), one can show that the buying level w b decreases. This relationship makes sense because as the person is more likely to die, she will be more willing to buy insurance for a fixed premium rate. Conversely, if λ is small and if wealth is small, then the individual has time to invest her wealth in such a way that it becomes greater than w b , at which point the individual will buy life insurance. For this individual with both λ and wealth small, buying insurance, with its constant drain on wealth, would not be the best way to achieve the bequest goal; ruining would be too likely.
Remark 3.2. As µ → r+ (or m → 0+), q in (3.3) approaches λ r if r ≥ λ and approaches 1 if r < λ, while p in (3.4) approaches 1 in either case. It follows that if r ≥ λ, then 
while the optimal amount invested in the risky asset converges to ∞.
If the risky asset's drift approaches that of the riskless asset, the two instruments are not equivalent unless σ also goes to 0. An investor still might wish to trade in the risky asset because of its volatility, which gives the individual a positive probability of achieving a higher return than with the riskless asset alone. From our work above, we deduce that the individual will not trade in the risky asset (as µ approaches r) if the riskless rate of return r is greater than the rate of mortality λ; the individual has enough time to reach the safe level without investing in the risky asset of drift r. By contrast, if the rate of mortality λ is greater than r, then the individual will invest an arbitrarily large amount in the risky asset while borrowing from the riskless because the individual has less time to reach her bequest goal before dying.
Next, we determine when the investment strategy in (3.6) results in leveraging, that is, when the individual borrows from the riskless asset to invest more than her current wealth in the risky. First note that, from the expression for the optimal investment strategy given in (3.6), we learn that π * (w) > w for some w > 0 if and only if
Thus, if (3.7) does not hold, then the optimal investment strategy in (3.6) automatically satisfies the property that one does not borrow from the riskless asset to invest in the risky asset. We present the following lemma that tells us when (3.7) holds.
Lemma 3.2. If λ ≥ µ+r 2 , then (3.7) holds for all σ > 0. If λ < µ+r 2 , then there exists a value of the volatility σ l > 0 such that (3.7) holds if and only if σ < σ l . Proof. One can show that σ 2 (1 − q) increases with respect to σ > 0; thus, the left side of inequality (3.7), µ−r σ 2 1 1−q , decreases with respect to σ. As σ approaches 0, σ 2 (1 − q) also approaches 0, so µ−r σ 2 1 1−q approaches ∞. As σ approaches ∞, the left side of (3.7) converges to
and the second expression is less than 1 if and only if λ < µ+r 2 . The statements in the lemma follow from these observations. We summarize the above results in a corollary that follows from Proposition 3.1 and Lemma 3.2. Recall that when we say that leveraging occurs at wealth w, we mean that π * (w) > w.
Corollary 3.3. If λ ≥ µ+r 2 , then, for all σ > 0, leveraging occurs for all wealth between 0 and the lending level w l = w s (p−1) σ 2 µ−r +1 > w b ("l" for lending or leveraging). If λ < µ+r 2 , then, for all σ less than some σ l > 0, leveraging occurs for all wealth between 0 and the lending level w l .
We call w l the lending level because for wealth greater than w l , the individual lends money to the bank by investing a positive amount in the riskelss asset. Note that the lending level depends on the value of σ, directly through σ 2 in the denominator and through m, an ingredient of p. In future work, we will restrict the investment strategy so that leveraging does not occur and will determine the optimal strategies for investing and for purchasing term life insurance, as in Bayraktar and Young (2007) .
The case for which c > 0
When c is large enough, we have an explicit expression for φ, D * , and π * , as in Proposition 3.1. Thus, we begin with that case, after which we treat the case for which c is small.
then the maximum probability of reaching the bequest goal is given by
2)
in which w s = c+h r+h , and in which p is given in (3.4). When wealth equals w, the optimal amount of instantaneous term life insurance is given by
3)
Proof. We use Lemma 2.1 to prove this proposition. Because p > 1, the function φ in (4.2) is increasing and concave. It clearly satisfies the boundary conditions of (2.6), and one can show that it satisfies the differential equation in (2.6) with D = 1−w. As indicated in (2.8), to show that D = 1 − w is optimal, we must show that
The left side of inequality (4.5) holds at w = 0 if and only if c ≥ C.
Furthermore, the left side of inequality (4.5) increases with respect to w; thus, if c ≥ C, then (4.5) holds on [0, w s ]. Finally, the optimal investment strategy in (4.4) follows from (2.7) and (4.2).
Remark 4.1. We were surprised when we obtained the result that if c is large enough, then the individual will buy life insurance at all wealth levels. It seems as if buying life insurance when consumption is large and when wealth is near zero would be more likely to lead to ruin than if the individual were not to buy life insurance when wealth is near zero.
That said, one can show that, as λ increases from 0 to h, C in (4.1) decreases from ∞ to 1 2 (r + m) + (r + 2h + m) 2 − 4h(r + h) . Thus, if the mortality rate λ is small, then C will be large, and the individual will not buy insurance at all wealth levels (and especially will not do so at small wealth levels; see Proposition 4.4 below), which makes sense because the individual is not likely to die soon if λ is small.
We have the following corollary of Proposition 4.1, which follows directly from the optimal investment strategy in (4.4).
Corollary 4.2. For c ≥ C, leveraging occurs in the optimal investment strategy for wealth between 0 and w l , in which
6)
in which w s = c+h r+h .
For the remainder of this section, we assume that 0 < c < C. In light of the optimal strategy for buying insurance when c = 0, we hypothesize that the optimal strategy is not to buy insurance if wealth is less than w b and to buy insurance if wealth is greater than w b , for some w b between 0 and w s . From this ansatz, it follows that for 0 ≤ w ≤ w b , we expect φ to solve
with φ and φ w continuous at w = w b , and with λ − h(1 − w)φ w (w b ) = 0, which will ensure that φ ww is also continuous at w = w b .
To solve this non-linear BVP, we suppose that φ is increasing and concave; thus, we define the dual variable Because φ is hypothesized to be increasing and concave with respect to w, we expectφ to be decreasing and convex with respect to y; this is something we show below.
It follows thatφ y (y) = −w andφ yy (y) = − 1 φ ww (w) .
Thus, the HJB equation in (4.7) becomes my 2φ yy − (r − λ)yφ y − λφ = cy, whose general solution isφ
in which
(4.11) and in which k 1 and k 2 are to be determined from the boundary conditions. Note that
Define y 0 = φ w (0); then,φ(y 0 ) = 0 =φ y (y 0 ). Apply these two conditions to the expression forφ in (4.10) and solve for k 1 and k 2 in terms of y 0 to obtain:
From these two conditions and from (4.10) and (4.12), we obtain
For w b ≤ w ≤ w s , we expect φ to be of the form
as in the second expression in (3.2). In the Legendre dual setting, with y = φ w (w) and φ(y) = φ(w) − wy, we haveφ (y) = ℓy β + 1 − w s y,
We get an expression for ℓ by requiringφ y (y b −) = −w b and by substituting for w b from (4.13):
From continuity ofφ at y = y b , we obtain c r
(4.16) and from (4.13) and (4.14), we obtain c r
(4.17)
Equations (4.16) and (4.17) have two unknowns, x = y b y 0 and y b . Solve each of the two equations for 1 y b , and equate the resulting expressions to obtain an equation for x:
Lemma 4.3. If 0 < c < C, in which C is given in (4.1) , then there exists a unique solution x ∈ (0, 1) of equation (4.18), or equivalently, of (4.19). Furthermore, x increases monotonically from 0 to 1 as c increases from 0 to C.
Proof. First, note that the left side of (4.18) increases with respect to x, and as x approaches 0, the left side of (4.18) approaches −∞. When x = 1, the left side equals
The left side at x = 1 is greater than the right side if and only if
which is equivalent to c < C. Thus, in that case, there exists a unique solution in (0, 1) of (4.18). Furthermore, one can use (4.18) or (4.19) to show that x increases from 0 to 1 as c increases from 0 to C.
If we substitute the solution x = y b y 0 ∈ (0, 1) of (4.18) into either equation (4.16) or (4.17), we obtain y b . Then, y 0 = y b
x , w b is given in (4.13), and k 1 and k 2 are given in (4.12). The coefficient ℓ is given in (4.15); alternatively, we can get B directly by applying the condition
as in the second expression of (3.2). Here, recall that w s = c+h r+h . We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4. If 0 < c < C, then the maximum probability of ruin is given by (4.20) in which y 0 and w b are obtained from equations (4.13), (4.17), and (4.18). In the first expression in (4.20) , for a given w ∈ [0, w b ), y ∈ (y b , y 0 ] uniquely solves
When wealth equals w, the optimal amount of instantaneous term life insurance is given by (4.22) and the optimal amount invested in the risky asset is given by
(4.23)
Proof. We use Lemma 2.1 to prove this proposition. First, continuity of φ at w = w b follows from (4.16), and continuity of
in which the first equality comes from the definition of y b and the second from (4.13).
Continuity of φ ww at w = w b follows from the equality of
To show that these two expressions are equal, equate them and show that the resulting expression is equivalent to (4.18), after substituting for w b in terms of y b and then for y b in terms of x. We omit the details of this exercise. Thus, we have demonstrated that φ in (4.20) is in C 2 [0, w s ].
That φ is increasing and concave on [0, w b ) follows from the fact thatφ is decreasing and convex on (y b , y 0 ]. To show thatφ is decreasing and convex on (y b , y 0 ], note that
The expression forφ yy is positive because α 2 < 0 and α 1 > 1. Also,φ y (y 0 ) = 0; thus, becauseφ y is increasing on (y b , y 0 ], it follows thatφ y (y) < 0 for y b ≤ y < y 0 . That φ is increasing and concave on [w b , w s ] follows easily from the second expression in (4.20). By construction, φ solves the BVP in (2.6). The expressions in (2.7) and (2.8) give the optimal investment and life insurance purchasing strategies in (4.23) and (4.22), respectively. Thus, we are done.
Remark 4.2. We expected that w b in (4.13) would decrease monotonically from 1−q p−q h r+h to 0 as c increases from 0 to C. However, we found some numerical results in which w b first increases and then decreases to 0 as c increases from 0 to C, a surprising result.
We present the following corollary of Propositions 3.1, 4.1, and 4.4, in which we give the process of optimally controlled wealth for wealth greater than w b (w b = 0 when c ≥ C) and observe that wealth never reaches the safe level w s .
Corollary 4.5. Let W * denote the optimally controlled wealth process. For all c ≥ 0, when W * t > w b , then W * t follows the process
Remark 4.3. Corollary 4.5 states that optimally controlled wealth never reaches the safe level. Young (2004) observed similar behavior of optimally controlled wealth when minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin under a constant rate of consumption. Furthermore, when c = 0, we deduce from the first expression in (3.6) that ruin cannot occur. However, when c > 0, ruin occurs with positive probability.
In the remainder of this section, we determine when the optimal investment strategy in (4.23) results in leveraging. We being with the following corollary of Proposition 4.4;
we omit the proof of this corollary because it follows from the expression of π * given in (4.23).
Corollary 4.6. If 0 < c < C, then π * (w) > w for a given w ∈ [0, w b ) if and only if g(z) > 0, in which z = y y 0 ∈ (x, 1], with y uniquely solving (4.21), and in which g is defined by
(4.24)
Recall that x = y b y 0 . Furthermore, g(1) > 0, so π * (w) > w in a neighborhood of 0, and if g(x) > 0, then from continuity of π * , it follows that π * (w) > w for all w b ≤ w < w l , in which w l is given in (4.6).
We use Corollary 4.6 to prove the following proposition, which covers the case for which µ−r σ 2 1 1−q ≤ 1. Proposition 4.7. If 0 < c < C and if µ−r σ 2 1 1−q ≤ 1, then there exists w l ∈ (0, w s ) such that π * (w) > w for all 0 ≤ w < w l , with π * (w) < w for all w l < w < w s . Moreover, there exists c l ∈ (0, C) such that (1) if 0 < c < c l , then w l ∈ (0, w b ), and (2) if c l ≤ c < C, then w l ≥ w b is given by the expression in (4.6).
Proof. Because µ−r σ 2 1 1−q ≤ 1, the function g given in (4.24) increases with respect to z; thus, there is at most one point z l ∈ (x, 1) at which (4.24) holds with equality. (Recall that 1 − α 2 = 1 1−q .) We, therefore, deduce that there exists w l ∈ (0, w s ) such that π * (w) > w for all
then w l is given by the expression in (4.6). It remains to show that w l ∈ (0, w b ) if and only if 0 < c < c l for some c l ∈ (0, C). From Corollary 4.6, we know that π * (w b ) > w b if and only if g(x) > 0, or equivalently, (4.25) after substituting for x α 2 −1 , which comes from (4.19). (Recall that x = y b y 0 is the unique solution in (0, 1) of (4.18), or equivalently, of (4.19).) Because x α 1 −1 ∈ (0, 1), inequality (4.25) cannot hold if B ≥ 1. Because µ−r σ 2 1 1−q ≤ 1, B defined in (4.25) decreases from ∞ to a number less than 1 as c increases from 0 to C. Thus, there exists c 1 ∈ (0, C) such that B ≥ 1 when 0 < c ≤ c 1 , which implies that π * (w b ) ≤ w b and w l ∈ (0, w b ) when 0 < c ≤ c 1 .
Next, consider c 1 < c < C. In this case, B < 1, and inequality (4.25) is true if and only if − c r
which we obtain from (4.19) because the left side of (4.19) strictly decreases with respect to x, or equivalently, if and only if
(4.26)
As observed earlier, inequality (4.26) does not hold when c = c 1 , because B = 1 when c = c 1 . When c = C, inequality (4.26) is equivalent to
, which holds if we can show the stronger inequality obtained by replacing the left side with 1 and by replacing > with ≥. Recall that B < 1 when c 1 < c < C and that α 2 −1 α 1 −1 < 0. The resulting stronger inequality is equivalent to
because clearly hp > λ. This last inequality is easy to show, so we have shown that (4.26)
holds when c = C.
Because the left side of inequality (4.26) increases with c and the right side decreases with c, it follows that there exists c l ∈ (c 1 , C) such that if c l ≤ c < C, then π * (w b ) ≥ w b , which implies that w l ≥ w b is given by the expression in (4.6). Also, if 0 < c < c l , then π * (w b ) < w b , which implies that w l ∈ (0, w b ).
We next consider the case for which λ ≥ µ+r 2 , which implies that µ−r σ 2 1 1−q > 1 for all σ > 0; see Lemma 3.2.
Proposition 4.8. If 0 < c < C and if λ ≥ µ+r 2 , then π * (w) > w for all 0 ≤ w < w l , with π * (w) < w for all w l < w < w s , in which w l > w b is given by the expression in (4.6). z c , g is, therefore, necessarily a minimum because as z increases from 0 to 1, g decreases from +∞ to the value at the critical point and then increases to a positive number. The conclusions of the proposition follow from these observations. We state the following corollary of Proposition 4.9 in which we provide a sufficient condition for π * (w) > w for all 0 ≤ w < w l .
Corollary 4.10. Suppose 0 < c < C and λ < µ+r 2 . If µ−r σ 2 q 1−q ≥ 1, then g(z c ) > 0, which implies that π * (w) > w for all 0 ≤ w < w l . Proof. One can show that g(z c ) > 0 if and only if
The first factor on the left side of this inequality is automatically greater than 1. The second factor is greater than or equal to 1 if µ−r σ 2 q 1−q ≥ 1, a stronger condition than µ−r σ 2 1 1−q > 1 because q < 1.
Remark 4.4. We see from Corollary 4.10 that to demonstrate cases 2b and 2c of Proposition 4.9, we will have to chose the parameters so that µ−r σ 2 1 1−q > 1 but not too much greater than 1. To that end, let r = 0.02, µ = 0.06, σ = 0.399, λ = 0.03, and h = 0.04. For these parameter values, c (2) l ), then leveraging occurs for wealth in the interval [0, 0.05285), thereby demonstrating case 2b of Proposition 4.9.
Summary and future work
We determined the optimal strategies for purchasing instantaneous term life insurance and for investing in a risky asset in order to maximize the probability of reaching a specific bequest goal. Here important features of the optimal strategies:
• When the rate of consumption is small enough (that is, 0 ≤ c < C), then it is optimal to buy insurance only when wealth greater than the buy level w b , which is strictly less than the safe level. This buy level is not monotone with respect to the rate of consumption, a surprising result.
• When the rate of consumption is large enough (that is, c ≥ C), then it is optimal to buy insurance at all wealth levels. This result, too, is surprising because if wealth is close to zero and one buys insurance, then the probability of ruin is greater than if one does not buy insurance.
• Of course, to reach the bequest goal, one has to do more than simply not ruin; one has to buy life insurance. In fact, the only way to reach the bequest goal is to buy life insurance because the investment strategy is such that wealth will never reach the safe level. • When wealth is greater than the buy level w b , the amount invested in the risky asset linearly decreases with wealth, with a limit of 0 as wealth approaches the safe level.
We also determined when leveraging occurs. See Corollaries 3.3 and 4.2 and Propositions 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 for specific results.
In future work, we will address a series of problems inspired by this paper. In particular, we will solve the problem of maximizing the probability of reaching a bequest goal when (1) investment in the risky asset is restricted to prohibit borrowing from the riskless asset, (2) consumption is an increasing function of wealth, (3) there is no riskless asset in the market, only a risky one, or (4) life annuities are included in the financial market to cover some or all of consumption. For the third problem, we anticipate that as the volatility of the risky asset approaches 0, then the optimal strategy for purchasing life insurance will approach the one when there is only a riskless asset in the financial market, as in Section 3.1 of Bayraktar et al. (2014a) . For the fourth problem, we expect that if the mortality rate used to price life annuities λ ′ is less than λ, then the individual will never buy life annuities because the safe level without buying life annuities, namely c+h r+h , is less than the safe level obtained by buying life annuities to cover consumption and life insurance to cover the bequest goal, namely c r+λ ′ + h r+h . We base this hypothesis on the work of Milevsky et al. (2006) ; they considered the problem of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin and showed that the individual never buys life annuities until wealth reaches the safe level c r+λ ′ .
